Which among the following is not a basic feature of the Constitution of India ?

1. The Amendment Power: Article 368 (basic)

To understand the Basic Structure Doctrine, we must first look at its source: Article 368. Think of the Constitution not as a static set of rules, but as a "living document" that must evolve with time. Article 368 provides the Parliament with the constituent power to amend the Constitution by way of addition, variation, or repeal. This power ensures the Constitution remains flexible enough to meet the changing needs of society while maintaining enough rigidity to prevent impulsive changes Indian Constitution at Work, Chapter 9, p. 213.

The procedure for amendment is rigorous and distinct from ordinary law-making. Under Article 368, an amendment can only be initiated by introducing a bill in either House of Parliament. Crucially, state legislatures have no power to initiate a constitutional amendment. The bill can be introduced by either a Minister or a Private Member and, unlike some financial bills, it does not require prior permission from the President Laxmikanth, Amendment of the Constitution, p. 123.

For an amendment to pass, it must meet the high threshold of a special majority in each House. This means:

• A majority of the total membership of the House.
• A majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting.

While Article 368(1) clarifies that Parliament has the express power to amend any part of the document, this power is not absolute. The landmark Kesavananda Bharati ruling (1973) clarified that while the procedure is laid out in Article 368, the power cannot be used to destroy the 'Basic Structure' of the Constitution, such as judicial independence or federalism D. D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, p. 196.

Sources: Indian Constitution at Work, CONSTITUTION AS A LIVING DOCUMENT, p.213; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Amendment of the Constitution, p.123; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu, Procedure for Amendment, p.196

2. Federalism: The Distribution of Power (basic)

At its simplest, Federalism is a system of government where power is not concentrated in a single center but is divided between a central authority and various regional units (like our States). Think of it as a dual-engine plane: both engines must work for the plane to fly stable. In India, this isn't just a matter of administrative convenience; it is a legal requirement where both the Union and the States derive their authority directly from the Constitution. This ensures that the States are not merely "agents" of the Center, but are sovereign in their own assigned spheres M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity, Federal System, p.138.

However, the Indian model is unique. We often call it "Federalism with a Unitary Bias." This means that while we have all the hallmarks of a federation—like a written Constitution and a division of powers—the Union government is gifted with extra strength to maintain national integrity, especially during emergencies D. D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF OUR CONSTITUTION, p.49. This balance allows India to be federal in normal times but function with unitary strength when the nation's security or stability is at stake.

Federal Features	Unitary (Non-Federal) Features
Dual Polity: Separate governments at Center and State levels.	Strong Center: More powers in the Union List and residuary powers.
Written Constitution: Clearly defines the powers of both levels.	Single Constitution: Usually, both Center and States follow the same document.
Division of Powers: Seventh Schedule (Union, State, and Concurrent Lists).	Emergency Provisions: Can transform the system into a unitary one.

Crucially for our study of the Basic Structure, Federalism is not just a policy choice that can be wiped away by a simple law. In the landmark S.R. Bommai case (1994), the Supreme Court explicitly declared Federalism to be a part of the "Basic Structure" of the Constitution M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity, Basic Structure of the Constitution, p.130. This means that even the Parliament, using its power to amend the Constitution, cannot destroy the federal character of India or unilaterally take away the essential powers of the States.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Federal System, p.138-139; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu, OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF OUR CONSTITUTION, p.49; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Basic Structure of the Constitution, p.130

3. The Independence of the Judiciary (intermediate)

To understand why the Independence of the Judiciary is a pillar of the Basic Structure, we must first look at its purpose. In a democracy, the judiciary acts as the 'watchdog' of the Constitution and the protector of Fundamental Rights. For a judge to rule against a powerful government or a popular legislature, they must be shielded from political pressure, career threats, or financial insecurity. As noted in Indian Constitution at Work, Chapter 6: Judiciary, p.126, the Constitution ensures this by excluding the legislature from the appointment process, ensuring that party politics does not dictate who sits on the bench. Instead, appointments are rooted in legal expertise and professional experience rather than political loyalty.

The Constitution provides several structural safeguards to maintain this autonomy. For instance, judges have a security of tenure; they cannot be removed at the whim of the executive but only through a rigorous process of 'proved misbehaviour or incapacity.' Furthermore, their salaries and allowances are charged on the Consolidated Fund, meaning they are not subject to an annual vote by the legislature. This financial and professional independence allows the judiciary to interpret the Constitution objectively. However, this independence is not a license for 'judicial tyranny.' As the eminent jurist Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar cautioned during the Constituent Assembly debates, the judiciary should not become a "super-legislature" but must remain accountable to the Constitution itself Indian Constitution at Work, Chapter 6: Judiciary, p.142.

In the context of the Basic Structure Doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that the independence of the judiciary is an essential feature that cannot be abridged even by a Constitutional Amendment. If the Parliament were allowed to interfere with judicial appointments or functions, the checks and balances of our democracy would collapse. Thus, judicial independence is not just a privilege for judges, but a fundamental right of the citizens to receive fair and impartial justice.

Safeguard Type	Description
Appointment	Legislature is not involved to minimize political interference.
Security of Tenure	Difficult removal process ensures judges don't fear losing their jobs for unpopular rulings.
Financial Independence	Salaries are non-votable, preventing the legislature from using financial cuts as a threat.

Sources: Indian Constitution at Work, Chapter 6: Judiciary, p.126, 142

4. Judicial Review vs. Parliamentary Sovereignty (intermediate)

To understand the Basic Structure Doctrine, we must first look at the tug-of-war between two powerful legal philosophies: Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review. In Great Britain, the Parliament is supreme. According to jurist A.V. Dicey, the British Parliament can make or unmake any law whatsoever, and no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament Laxmikanth, Parliament, p.263. This is often summarized by the famous saying that the British Parliament can do everything except make a woman a man and a man a woman.

On the other end of the spectrum is the United States, which follows the principle of Judicial Supremacy. Here, the Supreme Court has vast powers of Judicial Review to strike down laws it deems unconstitutional, often using the broad standard of 'due process of law'. In India, the framers chose a unique middle path. They wanted a synthesis: a Parliament powerful enough to bring social change, but a Judiciary independent enough to protect fundamental rights Laxmikanth, Salient Features of the Constitution, p.29.

In the Indian context, Article 13 acts as the cornerstone of Judicial Review, declaring that any law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights shall be void Laxmikanth, Judicial Review, p.297. However, the Parliament was also given the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368. The conflict arises when Parliament uses its amending power to limit the Court's review power. This was settled by the Kesavananda Bharati (1973) ruling, which clarified that while Parliament is not 'unquestioned' in its power to amend, the Judiciary is also not a 'super-legislature'. The result is a system where the Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, provided it does not damage its Basic Structure NCERT, Constitution as a Living Document, p.213.

Feature	British System	American System	Indian System
Primary Doctrine	Parliamentary Sovereignty	Judicial Supremacy	Synthesis of both
Review Power	Very Limited (Courts cannot nullify Acts)	Very Wide ('Due process of law')	Balanced ('Procedure established by law')
Constitution	Unwritten/Flexible	Written/Rigid	Written/Blend of Rigid & Flexible

Sources: Laxmikanth, M. Indian Polity, Parliament, p.263; Laxmikanth, M. Indian Polity, Salient Features of the Constitution, p.29; Laxmikanth, M. Indian Polity, Judicial Review, p.297; Indian Constitution at Work, NCERT, CONSTITUTION AS A LIVING DOCUMENT, p.213

5. Conflict between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs (exam-level)

To understand the Basic Structure Doctrine, we must first master the classic tug-of-war between Fundamental Rights (FRs) and Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs). Think of FRs as the 'individual’s shield' against state interference, while DPSPs are the 'state’s manual' for building a social welfare society. Because FRs are justiciable (enforceable by courts) and DPSPs are non-justiciable (moral obligations), a natural friction arises: Can the government take away an individual's right (like property) to fulfill a social goal (like land redistribution)? Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), Directive Principles of State Policy, p.179. Initially, the Supreme Court held that FRs were superior, but the government responded with various Constitutional Amendments to prioritize social welfare goals. This reached a boiling point in the 1970s. Through the 24th and 25th Amendments, the Parliament sought to give certain DPSPs (Articles 39b and 39c) precedence over FRs. This legislative-judicial battle eventually led to the Kesavananda Bharati case, where the court realized that while the Constitution can be amended, there are 'basic features' that must remain untouched to keep the spirit of the document alive. Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF OUR CONSTITUTION, p.53.

Feature	Fundamental Rights (Part III)	Directive Principles (Part IV)
Nature	Negative obligations (States shall not...)	Positive obligations (States shall strive to...)
Enforceability	Justiciable (Courts can enforce)	Non-justiciable (Moral/Political force)
Aim	Political Democracy	Social and Economic Democracy

The ultimate resolution came in the Minerva Mills Case (1980). The Supreme Court ruled that the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Part III and Part IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other would disturb the 'Basic Structure' of the Constitution. Like the two wheels of a chariot, both must work in tandem; one cannot be sacrificed for the other. Indian Constitution at Work, NCERT (2025 ed.), Chapter 9, p.213.

Sources: Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), Directive Principles of State Policy, p.179; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF OUR CONSTITUTION, p.53; Indian Constitution at Work, NCERT (2025 ed.), CONSTITUTION AS A LIVING DOCUMENT, p.213

6. Evolution of the Basic Structure Doctrine (exam-level)

The evolution of the Basic Structure Doctrine is a fascinating story of a 'tug-of-war' between the Parliament and the Judiciary. At its heart lies a simple question: Does the Parliament have the absolute power to change any part of the Constitution under Article 368, or are there certain 'soul' elements that must remain untouched? Initially, the Supreme Court took a literal view in the Shankari Prasad case (1951), ruling that the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, was unfettered Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.), Landmark Judgements and Their Impact, p.624. At this stage, the Constitution was seen as a flexible tool in the hands of the legislature to bring about social reform.

However, this stance shifted dramatically in 1967 with the I.C. Golak Nath case. Here, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier position, declaring that Fundamental Rights are given a 'transcendental and immutable' position and cannot be abridged or taken away by the Parliament, even through a Constitutional Amendment Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.), Landmark Judgements and Their Impact, p.626. This created a legal deadlock between the two branches of government, leading to the 24th Amendment Act, where Parliament tried to reassert its supreme power to amend any part of the document.

The ultimate resolution came in the landmark Kesavananda Bharati case (1973). In a marathon hearing by a 13-judge bench (the largest in Indian history), the Court struck a middle path. It ruled that while Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, it cannot alter its 'Basic Structure' Politics in India since Independence, Class XII (NCERT 2025 ed.), The Crisis of Democratic Order, p.97. This means the Parliament is not 'unquestioned' in its authority; it must respect the core identity of the Constitution, such as the independence of the judiciary and federalism Indian Constitution at Work, Class XI (NCERT 2025 ed.), CONSTITUTION AS A LIVING DOCUMENT, p.213.

Feature	Shankari Prasad (1951)	Golak Nath (1967)	Kesavananda Bharati (1973)
Power to Amend FRs	Yes	No	Yes (mostly)
Status of Art. 368	Absolute	Limited by Art. 13	Limited by "Basic Structure"

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.), Landmark Judgements and Their Impact, p.624, 626; Politics in India since Independence, Class XII (NCERT 2025 ed.), The Crisis of Democratic Order, p.97; Indian Constitution at Work, Class XI (NCERT 2025 ed.), CONSTITUTION AS A LIVING DOCUMENT, p.213

7. Limits on the Amending Power (exam-level)

To understand the limits on the amending power, we must first recognize that in India, the Constitution is supreme—not the Parliament. While Article 368 grants Parliament the authority to add, vary, or repeal any provision, this power is not a "blank check" to rewrite the entire document. As noted in M. Laxmikanth, Parliament, p.258, while the Constitution provides different procedures for amendment—ranging from a simple majority to a special majority with state ratification—these are merely the procedural tracks. The substantive limit lies in what can actually be changed.

The landmark 1973 Kesavananda Bharati ruling established that the Parliament cannot alter the "Basic Structure" of the Constitution. This means that while the body of the Constitution can change, its "soul" or identity must remain intact. For instance, federalism and the independence of the judiciary are considered essential features that Parliament cannot unilaterally override because they form the bedrock of our democratic framework. As explained in D. D. Basu, Procedure for Amendment, p.197, these overarching principles fall outside the scope of Article 368; the Parliament cannot use its power to abrogate the very values that make the Constitution what it is.

A crucial nuance introduced in the Minerva Mills case (1980) is that "a limited amending power" is itself a basic feature of our Constitution. If Parliament were allowed to use Article 368 to grant itself unlimited power, it would be destroying the limitation intended by the founders. In the words of the Supreme Court, a donee of a limited power cannot, by the exercise of that power, convert the limited power into an unlimited one M. Laxmikanth, Basic Structure of the Constitution, p.128. Therefore, any amendment that seeks to take away the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review over constitutional amendments is itself unconstitutional.

Type of Limitation	Description	Source
Procedural	The specific majorities and steps required under Article 368.	Article 368 Text
Substantive	The prohibition against altering the "Basic Structure" (e.g., Secularism, Democracy).	Judicial Doctrine

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Parliament, p.258; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), Procedure for Amendment, p.197; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Basic Structure of the Constitution, p.128

8. Solving the Original PYQ (exam-level)

This question is a classic application of the Basic Structure Doctrine, a concept you've just explored through the lens of the landmark Kesavananda Bharati case (1973). In your recent lessons, you learned that while Article 368 grants Parliament the power to amend the Constitution, this power is not absolute. The core "building blocks" of our democracy—such as Federalism, Fundamental Rights, and the Independence of the Judiciary—form a foundation that cannot be demolished even by a constitutional amendment. When tackling this PYQ, you are essentially identifying which option violates the principle of constitutional supremacy.

To arrive at the correct answer, (D) The unquestioned right of the Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution, you must spot the qualifier that contradicts the spirit of Indian law. The word "unquestioned" is a major red flag. Under our system of Judicial Review, the Supreme Court acts as the final interpreter and guardian; therefore, no legislative action is beyond question if it threatens the document's identity. While Parliament can indeed amend parts of the Fundamental Rights or modify federal arrangements, it cannot destroy their essential character. Options (A), (B), and (C) are all established pillars of the basic structure as discussed in Indian Constitution at Work, Political Science Class XI (NCERT 2025 ed.), making them "basic features" and thus the wrong choices for a "not" question.

A common trap UPSC sets is using extreme or absolute language like "unquestioned," "sole," or "total." Students often get confused because Parliament does have vast amending powers, but in India, the Constitution is supreme, not the Parliament. The Independence of the Judiciary serves as a check to ensure that the essence of the Constitution remains protected from temporary political majorities. As noted in the Constitution of India (Ministry of Law and Justice), the legal framework provides for a balanced distribution of power, which fundamentally rejects the idea of any organ having unlimited authority to alter the nation's core identity.