With reference to the history of ancient India, which of the following statements is/are correct? 1. Mitakshara was the civil law for upper castes and Dayabhaga was the civil law for lower castes. 2. In the Mitakshara system, the sons can claim right to the property during the lifetime of the father, whereas in the Dayabhaga system, it is only after the death of the father that the sons can claim right to the property. 3. The Mitakshara system deals with the matters related to the property held by male members only of a family, whereas the Dayabhaga system deals with the matters related to the property held by both male and female members of a family. Select the correct answer using the code given below.

Describes dharmasthiya courts as handling civil law (marriage, inheritance) and presided over by judges well-versed in sacred laws — showing civil matters were governed by religious-legal schools.

A student could check whether Dayabhaga (a sacred-legal school) was applied generally in dharmasthiya courts or was restricted to particular castes/communities using regional studies or court records.

Says pre-British judicial practice 'paid heed to caste distinctions' and differentiated punishments and legal treatment by caste, indicating law application could vary by caste.

One can infer it was plausible for different legal customs or schools to apply to different castes and thus investigate whether Dayabhaga was one such variant used for lower castes.

Explains lower castes were placed at the bottom of chaturvarna and subject to concepts of purity/pollution — social categories that often influenced legal rights (e.g., inheritance, marriage).

Use this social background to assess whether a legal school might have had caste-specific rules affecting lower castes, prompting targeted textual or regional inquiry about Dayabhaga provisions.

Notes lower castes' typical occupations and social roles and that caste and landownership produced stratification — factors directly relevant to civil law areas like tenancy and inheritance.

A student could look for Dayabhaga rules on inheritance/tenancy to see if they contain special provisions for occupational or lower-caste groups.

Links the notion of 'backward classes' to caste, occupation and legal identification, showing that legal regimes have been considered in relation to caste status.

This connection supports examining constitutional/colonial-era or classical legal commentaries to see if Dayabhaga was described or later treated as applying to 'backward' or lower castes.

Notes that doctrines presented as ‘Hindu law’ (here re: succession/adoption) were sometimes inconclusive or varied in practice.

A student could use this to justify checking whether Mitakshara rules were one of those variable doctrines or had clear prescriptions about sons' rights during a father's life.

States the general patrilineal principle that 'sons could claim the resources (including the throne) of their fathers when the latter died' — tying inheritance claim to the father's death.

A student could contrast this general rule (inheritance at death) with the claim that Mitakshara gave sons rights during the father's lifetime and look for sources that confirm which approach Mitakshara followed.

Describes social shift from lineage to more territorial polities and notes lineages as groups descended from a common ancestor — context for how inheritance and patrimony were socially organized.

A student might use this context to reason that norms of lineage-based property transmission (whether at death or earlier) could vary with social/political forms and test if Mitakshara norms align with lineage or territorial patterns.

Explains hereditary succession of rulers (sons usually succeeding fathers) — another example where rights transfer on death rather than during the predecessor's lifetime.

A student can analogize royal succession patterns (inheritance at successor’s assumption) to family property norms and investigate whether Mitakshara mirrored this 'at death' transfer or allowed rights by birth.

Provides a cross-cultural contrast (Roman family) where adult sons were independent and inheritance patterns differed, showing that family-property norms vary by society.

A student could use this contrast to frame a comparative test: if Roman norms differ, check primary sources on Mitakshara to see which model it resembled (joint family/right by birth vs. post-death succession).

Describes patriliny as a system where sons could claim their fathers' resources when the latter died — a general pattern tying male inheritance to the father's death.

A student could compare this general patrilineal rule with regional legal texts (e.g., Dayabhaga) to check whether Dayabhaga followed the same ‘rights on death’ timing.

Discusses Hindu law and inheritance in the context of the doctrine of lapse and notes that Hindu law was 'somewhat inconclusive' on who inherits, indicating variation and legal debate about inheritance rules.

A student can use this hint of legal inconclusiveness to justify checking whether Dayabhaga (a named school) specifically ties sons' rights to the father's death or recognizes other timings.

Mentions legal modification that a son's change of religion did not debar him from inheriting his father's property—shows inheritance rights were conceived as a legal entitlement to property of a (deceased or living) father.

A student could use this example of legal treatment of inheritance to investigate whether entitlement under various schools (including Dayabhaga) is contingent on the father's death or exists earlier.

Gives an example of royal succession where a son (Bindusara) succeeded his father, implying succession/rights activated on the predecessor's removal (death or renunciation).

A student might contrast succession practices in political rulership with family-property laws (Dayabhaga) to test whether both contexts treat sons' rights as arising on death.

States that the family system was primarily patriarchal and inheritance was through the male line, implying legal/informal rules favouring male property rights.

A student could combine this with the fact that Mitakshara is a classical Hindu-law commentary to hypothesize that its rules likely reflect male-line inheritance norms.

Says Hindu women did not enjoy the right to inherit property, indicating common legal/social exclusion of women from inheritance.

Use this pattern to infer that major Hindu legal schools (like Mitakshara) might primarily regulate male-held property if women typically lacked inheritance rights.

Notes the patriarchal family system with women possessing little individuality and the miserable plight of widows, reinforcing limited female property claims in practice.

A student could treat this as contextual support that legal doctrines emerging in such a setting would focus on male proprietorship and succession.

Describes the traditional Hindu custom of adoption of a son who then had right to inherit property, emphasizing male-line succession mechanisms.

Combine this specific male-heir emphasis with knowledge that Mitakshara deals with inheritance to suspect it centers on male heirs and their property rights.

Gives an example where women (including widows) sometimes did inherit and participate in the land market, showing exceptions to the general male-focused pattern.

A student could use this to test the statement by seeking whether Mitakshara incorporated such exceptions or whether its scope was limited to male property only.