The tendency for increased litigation was visible after the introduction of the land settlement system of Lord Cornwallis in 179 3. The reason for this is normally traced to which of the following provisions.

1. Evolution of British Land Revenue (1765–1793) (basic)

The British transition from merchants to masters began in 1765, following their victory at the Battle of Buxar. The Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II granted the East India Company the Diwani rights—the legal authority to collect land revenue and manage civil justice—for the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Historical Background, p.1. This transformed a commercial entity into a territorial power, making land revenue the primary engine for the Company's profits and military expansions Indian Economy, Vivek Singh, Land Reforms, p.190. However, the Company lacked the administrative machinery to collect taxes directly. For the first few years, they relied on local Indian officials, leading to massive corruption and the devastating Bengal Famine of 1770. In 1772, Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General, decided that the Company must take charge directly. He introduced the Five-Year Settlement (also known as the Izaredari or Farming System), where the right to collect revenue was auctioned off to the highest bidders for a period of five years Indian Economy, Vivek Singh, Land Reforms, p.190. This auction system proved to be a failure. Because the bidders (often urban speculators with no interest in farming) wanted to secure the contract at any cost, they made extravagant bids that the land simply could not support. To meet these high targets, they oppressed the peasants, leading to a decline in agriculture. For the Company, this meant revenue was unpredictable and often fell short of expectations Modern India, Bipin Chandra, The Structure of the Government and the Economic Policies of the British Empire in India, 1757—1857, p.102. The chaos of these early experiments eventually convinced the British that they needed a more stable, long-term solution, which set the stage for the Permanent Settlement of 1793 under Lord Cornwallis A Brief History of Modern India, Rajiv Ahir (Spectrum), The Indian States, p.604.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Historical Background, p.1; Indian Economy, Vivek Singh, Land Reforms, p.190; Modern India, Bipin Chandra, The Structure of the Government and the Economic Policies of the British Empire in India, 1757—1857, p.102; A Brief History of Modern India, Rajiv Ahir (Spectrum), The Indian States, p.604

2. The Permanent Settlement (Zamindari System) Features (basic)

The Permanent Settlement of 1793, introduced by Lord Cornwallis in Bengal, Bihar, and Odisha, was a revolutionary attempt to create a stable revenue base for the East India Company. After experimenting with temporary bidding systems that caused financial instability, the British decided to fix the land revenue demand permanently. This meant the government could never increase its share in the future, providing the state with a predictable income while theoretically encouraging landlords to invest in land improvement. Indian Economy, Vivek Singh (7th ed. 2023-24), Chapter 5: Land Reforms, p.190

The structural core of this system was the transformation of Zamindars. Previously, they were essentially tax collectors or intermediaries; under this Act, they were elevated to the status of hereditary owners (landlords) of the land. Modern India, Bipin Chandra (NCERT 1982 ed.), p.102. The land became their private property, which they could sell or mortgage. However, this right was tied to the 'Sunset Law'—a strict provision where the zamindar had to pay the fixed revenue by sunset on a specific day, failing which their land would be confiscated and auctioned. History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), Chapter 17: Effects of British Rule, p.266

The revenue sharing was precisely calculated to ensure the Company took the lion's share. The total collection was typically divided as follows:

Stakeholder	Share of Revenue Collected
East India Company	10/11th (The bulk for the colonial state)
Zamindar	1/11th (As payment for collection and ownership)

Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania (2nd ed. 2021-22), Chapter 10: Land Reforms in India, p.337

While this system created a loyal class of landed aristocrats for the British, it was disastrous for the actual cultivators (the ryots). Since the government's demand was fixed but the zamindar’s demand from the peasant was not, zamindars often over-extracted rent to maximize their own profits or to meet the high state demand and avoid the Sunset Law. The peasants were essentially reduced to tenants-at-will on the land their ancestors had farmed for generations.

Sources: Indian Economy, Vivek Singh (7th ed. 2023-24), Chapter 5: Land Reforms, p.190; Modern India, Bipin Chandra (NCERT 1982 ed.), The Structure of the Government and the Economic Policies of the British Empire in India, 1757—1857, p.102; History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), Chapter 17: Effects of British Rule, p.266; Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania (2nd ed. 2021-22), Chapter 10: Land Reforms in India, p.337

3. Comparative Land Tenures: Ryotwari and Mahalwari (intermediate)

After the challenges of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, the British sought alternative systems as they expanded into Southern and Northern India. They moved away from creating 'landlords' and experimented with more direct or collective forms of assessment. These two systems, Ryotwari and Mahalwari, represent the colonial government's attempt to maximize revenue while addressing local social structures.

The Ryotwari System was founded on the principle of a direct contract between the state and the individual cultivator or peasant, known as the Ryot. Introduced by Sir Thomas Munro and Captain Alexander Reed around 1820 in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, it eliminated intermediaries like Zamindars Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania, Chapter 10, p.337. Under this system, the peasant was recognized as the proprietor of the land as long as they paid the revenue. Philosophically, it was based on the Scientific Rent Theory of David Ricardo, which argued that the state was entitled to the 'surplus' profit of the land Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania, Chapter 10, p.337. However, the revenue rates were extremely high—often 50% for dry lands and 60% for irrigated lands—leaving the peasants vulnerable to moneylenders when crops failed History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), Chapter 17, p.266.

In contrast, the Mahalwari System, introduced by Lord William Bentinck in 1833, was designed for the North-Western Provinces, Punjab, and the Ganga Valley. Here, the unit of assessment was the Mahal (a village or an estate). Unlike the individual focus of Ryotwari, Mahalwari emphasized collective responsibility; the village community as a whole was responsible for the revenue Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania, Chapter 10, p.338. While ownership often stayed with the peasants, the village headman (often called the Lambardar) acted as the link between the community and the state. It was essentially a modified version of the Zamindari system, but at a communal level Indian Economy, Vivek Singh, Chapter 5, p.191.

Comparison of Ryotwari and Mahalwari Systems:

Feature	Ryotwari System	Mahalwari System
Primary Unit	Individual Peasant (Ryot)	Village/Estate (Mahal)
Introduced By	Thomas Munro & Alexander Reed	Holt Mackenzie & William Bentinck
Responsibility	Individual responsibility to pay	Joint/Collective responsibility
Regions	Madras, Bombay, Assam	Ganga Valley, NWFP, Punjab
Intermediary	None (Direct settlement)	Village Headman (as a representative)

Sources: Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania, Chapter 10: Land Reforms in India, p.337-338; Indian Economy, Vivek Singh, Chapter 5: Land Reforms, p.191; History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), Chapter 17: Effects of British Rule, p.266

4. The Cornwallis Code: Separation of Powers (intermediate)

The Cornwallis Code of 1793 represents a pivotal moment in Indian administrative history, transitioning the East Bengal administration from a system of personal whims to one based on the Rule of Law. Before these reforms, the District Collector was an all-powerful figure—he acted as the tax collector, the administrator, and the judge for revenue disputes. Lord Cornwallis viewed this concentration of power as a recipe for corruption and a violation of the principle of fairness, as the person interested in collecting revenue shouldn't be the one judging its legality (Modern India, Bipin Chandra, p.111). To remedy this, Cornwallis introduced the Separation of Powers. He stripped the Collectors of their judicial and magisterial duties, restricting them solely to revenue collection. In their place, he established a hierarchy of civil courts, headed at the district level by a District Judge who belonged to the Civil Service (A Brief History of Modern India, Rajiv Ahir, p.816). This ensured that the judiciary was, in theory, independent of the executive branch that collected taxes.

Feature	Pre-1793 System	Post-1793 (Cornwallis Code)
Role of Collector	Collected revenue AND judged disputes.	Strictly limited to revenue administration.
Judicial Authority	Vested in the executive (Revenue Board).	Vested in independent Diwani Adalats.
Legal Recourse	Difficult to sue the state.	Government officials were made answerable to civil courts for official acts.

Furthermore, Cornwallis aimed to make justice accessible by abolishing court fees. He believed that the high cost of litigation prevented the poor from seeking justice against oppressive Zamindars. However, this idealism had an unintended consequence: it triggered a massive litigation boom. With no fees and a new legal framework defining property rights, the courts were suddenly overwhelmed by thousands of cases, leading to long delays that plagued the colonial legal system for decades to come.

Sources: Modern India (Old NCERT), Administrative Organisation and Social and Cultural Policy, p.111; A Brief History of Modern India (Spectrum), After Nehru..., p.816

5. Judicial Reforms and the New Court Hierarchy (intermediate)

To understand the judicial reforms under Lord Cornwallis, we must first look at the principle of Separation of Powers. Before 1793, the District Collector was a 'mini-monarch' who collected land revenue and also sat as a judge to decide disputes over that same revenue. Cornwallis realized this was a conflict of interest. Under the Cornwallis Code of 1793, he stripped Collectors of their judicial powers, confining them strictly to revenue collection, and established a specialized hierarchy of civil courts to handle legal disputes History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), Chapter 17, p.269. This reform introduced the Sovereignty of Law, meaning that even government officials could now be sued in civil courts for actions taken in their official capacity Rajiv Ahir, A Brief History of Modern India, Constitutional, Administrative and Judicial Developments, p.522.

The new judicial hierarchy was structured to provide multiple layers of appeal, moving from local concerns to imperial oversight:

• Munsiff’s Courts: Led by Indian officers to handle small-value local cases.
• Registrar’s Courts: Presided over by European judges.
• District (Zila) Courts: The primary court for the district, headed by a District Judge.
• Provincial Courts of Appeal: Four circuit courts that acted as intermediaries between the district and the capital.
• Sadar Diwani Adalat: The highest civil court of appeal in Calcutta, presided over by the Governor-General and his Council.
• King-in-Council: For massive disputes (valued at £5,000 or more), the final appeal went to London Rajiv Ahir, A Brief History of Modern India, Constitutional, Administrative and Judicial Developments, p.522.

This system was essential for the success of the Permanent Settlement. Because land had become a private, saleable commodity, the British needed a predictable legal framework to settle the inevitable disputes between Zamindars, tenants, and the State. However, a significant side effect occurred: by initially abolishing court fees and allowing ryots (peasants) the right to sue, the courts were immediately overwhelmed by a massive backlog of litigation, as every boundary dispute or rent disagreement now had a formal legal forum for resolution.

Sources: History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), Chapter 17: Effects of British Rule, p.269; A Brief History of Modern India (SPECTRUM), Constitutional, Administrative and Judicial Developments, p.522

6. The Sunset Clause and Zamindari Distress (exam-level)

When Lord Cornwallis introduced the Permanent Settlement in 1793, the British East India Company sought financial stability. To ensure this, they didn't just fix the revenue amount; they introduced a ruthless enforcement mechanism known as the Sunset Law. According to this law, if a zamindar failed to pay the state's revenue demand by the sunset of the specified date, their estate (zamindari) was liable to be auctioned off to the highest bidder THEMES IN INDIAN HISTORY PART III, COLONIALISM AND THE COUNTRYSIDE, p.230. This turned land into a commodity that could be seized and sold for defaults, a concept foreign to traditional Indian land relations.

In the initial years, this system caused immense distress. The revenue demand was set extraordinarily high because the Company wanted to safeguard its future income against inflation. Many zamindars found it impossible to collect such high rents from the ryots (peasants), especially during years of poor harvests or low market prices. Furthermore, the Company intentionally subdued the authority of the zamindars to prevent them from becoming rival power centers. Their private militias were disbanded, their customs duties were abolished, and their cutcheries (local courts) were placed under the supervision of a Company-appointed Collector THEMES IN INDIAN HISTORY PART III, COLONIALISM AND THE COUNTRYSIDE, p.230. Without their traditional judicial and police powers, zamindars struggled to coerce the ryots into paying rent on time, leading to massive revenue arrears.

Interestingly, the zamindars did not always give up their lands quietly. To survive the Sunset Law, many resorted to benami transactions — fictitious sales where the zamindar's own agents or relatives would buy the estate during the public auction. Between 1793 and 1801, for instance, nearly 15% of auction sales were discovered to be fictitious THEMES IN INDIAN HISTORY PART III, COLONIALISM AND THE COUNTRYSIDE, p.233. If an outsider did manage to buy an estate, the old zamindar’s lathyals (strongmen) would often physically prevent the new owner's agents from taking possession. This friction between legal ownership and ground reality defined the early decades of the Permanent Settlement.

Feature	Pre-1793 Zamindar	Post-1793 (Permanent Settlement)
Revenue	Fluctuated based on harvest.	Fixed in perpetuity; high initial demand.
Authority	Maintained cutcheries and local police.	Powers transferred to the British Collector.
Land Rights	Customary right to collect rent.	Legal owner, but land liable to auction for default.

Sources: THEMES IN INDIAN HISTORY PART III, COLONIALISM AND THE COUNTRYSIDE, p.230; THEMES IN INDIAN HISTORY PART III, COLONIALISM AND THE COUNTRYSIDE, p.233; Modern India, Bipin Chandra, Economic Impact of the British Rule, p.188

7. Causes of Increased Litigation under Cornwallis (exam-level)

To understand why litigation exploded under Lord Cornwallis, we must look at the structural shift from a system of discretionary power to a system of Rule of Law. Before 1793, the Collector was a 'little Napoleon' in his district, holding both executive and judicial powers. Cornwallis, influenced by European ideas of checks and balances, introduced the Cornwallis Code of 1793, which fundamentally separated the revenue administration from the administration of justice. The Collector was now restricted to tax collection, while judicial powers were vested in a new hierarchy of civil courts, headed by a District Judge Rajiv Ahir, A Brief History of Modern India, p.522.

The surge in litigation was a direct byproduct of this judicialization of land rights. By making the Zamindars hereditary owners and fixing the revenue in perpetuity, the British created a rigid legal framework. Every dispute—whether it was a Zamindar suing a tenant for rent or a tenant complaining of illegal exactions—now had to be settled in a Diwani Adalat (Civil Court) Modern India (Old NCERT), Administrative Organisation and Social and Cultural Policy, p.111. Furthermore, Cornwallis initially abolished court fees and allowed government officials to be sued in civil courts for official lapses. While intended to make justice accessible and transparent, it effectively opened the floodgates for thousands of cases that the skeletal colonial judicial machinery was not equipped to handle.

The nature of the Permanent Settlement itself fueled this fire. Since the Company's revenue demand was fixed very high, Zamindars often defaulted, leading to their lands being auctioned under the 'Sun-set Law'. These auctions were frequently contested through benami (fictitious) transactions and long-drawn legal battles as old Zamindars fought to keep their ancestral lands from new urban buyers Themes in Indian History Part III (NCERT), Colonialism and the Countryside, p.233.

Sources: A Brief History of Modern India (Spectrum), Constitutional, Administrative and Judicial Developments, p.522; Modern India (Bipin Chandra/Old NCERT), Administrative Organisation and Social and Cultural Policy, p.111; Themes in Indian History Part III (NCERT 2025), Colonialism and the Countryside, p.233

8. Solving the Original PYQ (exam-level)

To solve this question, you must synthesize your knowledge of Land Revenue Administration with the Judicial Reforms of the late 18th century. While the Permanent Settlement established the structural relationship between the state, the Zamindar, and the Ryot, the surge in litigation was a byproduct of the Cornwallis Code of 1793. This code shifted the basis of governance from customary practices to a complex legal framework where every right and liability was defined by written law. As you learned, making land a transferable property and fixing revenue in perpetuity turned every disagreement into a legal battle that could only be settled in a colonial court.

The reasoning to arrive at the correct answer, (D) None of the (a), (b) and (c) above, requires looking for the specific procedural triggers of the litigation boom. Historically, the primary drivers were the abolition of court fees (which made filing suits temporarily affordable) and the separation of the executive from the judiciary. By removing the judicial powers of the Revenue Collectors and making the government and Zamindars suable in civil courts, Cornwallis inadvertently opened the floodgates. As noted in History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.) and Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania, the institutional change—not just the land settlement itself—was the catalyst for the over-burdened courts.

UPSC often uses distractor traps like options (A) and (B), which are factually correct descriptions of the Permanent Settlement but do not provide the causal link to the litigation. Strengthening the Zamindar or establishing the Company as overlord defined "who" held power, but it didn't explain "why" everyone was suddenly suing each other. Option (C) is a teleological trap; while Cornwallis aimed for efficiency, the "tendency for increased litigation" is a sign of a system under pressure, not a proof of its efficiency. Always distinguish between the objectives of a policy and the unintended procedural consequences it creates.