Which one among the following is not a recommendation of the Sarkaria Commission on the appointment of the Governor in a State?

1. The Constitutional Role of the Governor (basic)

Welcome to your first step in mastering the constitutional machinery of India! To understand the Governor, we must first look at how our states are governed. The Constitution of India establishes a parliamentary system at the state level, which is a mirror image of the system at the Centre. Under Part VI of the Constitution, specifically Articles 153 to 167, the framework for the State Executive is laid down. This executive body consists of the Governor, the Chief Minister, the Council of Ministers, and the Advocate General of the state. It is important to note a key distinction: unlike the Centre which has a Vice-President, there is no office of Vice-Governor in the states Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, p.313.

The Governor occupies a unique "dual role" in the Indian federal structure. On one hand, the Governor is the chief executive head of the state. However, much like the President of India, they are a nominal or titular executive head. This means that while all executive actions of the state government are formally taken in the Governor's name, the real power is exercised by the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. On the other hand, the Governor acts as a vital link or agent of the Central Government, as they are appointed by the President and hold office during the President's pleasure Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, p.313.

This dual identity is precisely why the role is often a subject of intense debate. Because the Governor is an appointed official rather than an elected one, their actions are sometimes viewed as Central interference in state matters, particularly when different political parties are in power at the Centre and the State Indian Constitution at Work, NCERT, p.166. To maintain the balance of our federal system, constitutional experts and commissions like the Sarkaria Commission have historically emphasized that the Governor must function as a non-partisan figure, ensuring the smooth functioning of constitutional machinery rather than acting as a political tool Indian Constitution at Work, NCERT, p.166.

Feature	Governor	President
Executive Head	Head of the State	Head of the Union
Nature of Power	Nominal / Titular	Nominal / Titular
Election/Appointment	Appointed by President	Elected (Indirectly)

Sources: Indian Polity, Governor, p.313; Indian Constitution at Work, Federalism, p.166

2. Appointment and Tenure (Article 155-156) (basic)

In the Indian federal structure, the Governor occupies a unique position as both the constitutional head of the state and a vital link to the Union government. Unlike the President, who is indirectly elected, the Governor is directly appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal (Article 155). This means the Governor is a nominee of the Central government, a design chosen by our founding fathers to ensure national unity and prevent friction between a popular Chief Minister and an elected Governor. M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity, p.315

The tenure of the Governor is defined under Article 156, which introduces the concept of 'Pleasure of the President'. While the Constitution mentions a normal term of five years, this is not a guaranteed security of tenure. The Governor can be removed by the President at any time without assigned reasons, and the Supreme Court has held that this 'pleasure' is generally not open to judicial review. D. D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, p.269

To prevent the misuse of these powers and ensure the office remains non-partisan, the Sarkaria Commission (1983–1988) provided several landmark recommendations regarding the selection process:

• The appointee should be an eminent person from outside the state (to ensure detachment from local politics).
• The person should not have been active in politics in the recent past.
• The Chief Minister of the state must be consulted before the appointment to ensure smooth Centre-State relations.
• The five-year term should not be disturbed except for extremely rare and compelling reasons.

It is important to note that the Commission did not suggest consulting the Chief Justice of India for this appointment, as the role is primarily an executive bridge between the Union and the State. M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity, p.323

Article	Key Provision
Article 155	Appointment by the President of India.
Article 156(1)	Holds office during the Pleasure of the President.
Article 156(2)	Resignation letter addressed to the President.
Article 156(3)	Normal term of 5 years from the date of joining.

Sources: Indian Polity, Governor, p.315, 323; Introduction to the Constitution of India, The State Executive, p.269

3. Discretionary Powers and Friction Points (intermediate)

In the Indian constitutional scheme, the Governor is not just a titular head like the President; they possess a unique dual role as the constitutional head of the state and a representative of the Union government. This duality is the primary source of 'friction' in Centre-State relations. While the President’s discretionary powers are mostly situational (implicit), the Constitution explicitly grants the Governor certain discretionary powers under Article 163. M. Laxmikanth, Governor, p.321.

One of the most significant friction points arises from Article 163(2), which states that if any question arises as to whether a matter falls within the Governor's discretion, the decision of the Governor is final. This decision cannot be challenged on the ground that they ought not to have acted in their discretion. M. Laxmikanth, State Council of Ministers, p.330. This 'finality' often leads to political disputes, especially regarding the appointment of a Chief Minister during a hung assembly or the recommendation for President’s Rule (Article 356).

Another major area of conflict is the Reservation of Bills (Article 200). While the Governor generally acts on the 'aid and advice' of the Council of Ministers, they can use their discretion to reserve a bill for the President's consideration. Specifically, the Governor must reserve any bill that endangers the position of the High Court. D. D. Basu, The State Executive, p.276. Once a bill is reserved, the President (acting on the advice of the Union Cabinet) has the power to give or withhold assent, effectively giving the Centre a 'veto' over state legislation. M. Laxmikanth, President, p.196.

To understand the difference in discretionary scope between the two highest executive offices, look at this comparison:

Feature	President of India	Governor of a State
Constitutional Discretion	None explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.	Explicitly mentioned under Article 163.
Ministerial Advice	Bound by advice (42nd & 44th Amendments).	Bound by advice except in discretionary matters.
Ordinance Making	Not a discretionary power. D. D. Basu, The State Legislature, p.291	Not a discretionary power; requires ministerial advice.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Governor, p.321; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), State Council of Ministers, p.330; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), The State Executive, p.276; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), The State Legislature, p.291

4. Emergency Provisions: Article 356 (intermediate)

At the heart of the Governor's most controversial powers lies Article 356, commonly known as President's Rule. This provision allows the Union to intervene when the 'constitutional machinery' in a state breaks down. While the Constitution intended for this to be an extraordinary measure to preserve national integrity, it has historically been a 'drastic coercive power' that can strip away the federal character of our polity D. D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, Emergency Provisions, p.417. The Governor acts as the critical link here, submitting a report to the President stating that the state government can no longer function according to the Constitution. Interestingly, the President can also act suo motu (on their own motion) if they are satisfied such a situation exists, often triggered by a state’s failure to comply with Union directives under Article 365.

For decades, Article 356 was frequently misused for political ends—often to dismiss state governments run by opposition parties. However, the landmark S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994) case fundamentally changed the landscape. The Supreme Court declared that Federalism is a part of the 'Basic Structure' of the Constitution and that the President’s proclamation is subject to judicial review M. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity, Basic Structure of the Constitution, p.130. This means the court can examine the material on which the Governor’s report is based to ensure it isn't malafide or based on irrelevant grounds.

A crucial procedural safeguard established by the Court is that the Legislative Assembly cannot be dissolved until the Presidential Proclamation is approved by both Houses of Parliament. Until then, the Governor can only keep the Assembly in suspended animation. If the Parliament fails to approve the proclamation within two months, or if the Court finds the proclamation unconstitutional, it has the power to restore the status quo ante—effectively reviving the dismissed Ministry and the dissolved Assembly D. D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, Emergency Provisions, p.419.

Feature	Pre-Bommai Era (Practice)	Post-Bommai Era (Law)
Judicial Review	Limited; considered a political question.	Proclamation is subject to judicial scrutiny.
Assembly Dissolution	Often dissolved immediately upon proclamation.	Cannot be dissolved until Parliamentary approval.
Burden of Proof	On the petitioner to prove it was wrong.	On the Centre to justify the necessity of the power.

Sources: Introduction to the Constitution of India, Emergency Provisions, p.417-419; Indian Polity, Basic Structure of the Constitution, p.130

5. Major Commissions on Centre-State Relations (intermediate)

Hello there! As we move deeper into the role of the Governor, we must address the friction that often arises between the Centre and the States. To resolve these tensions, several high-level commissions have been established over the decades to suggest reforms in how a Governor is chosen and how they should function. Understanding these recommendations is crucial because they form the blueprint for a more cooperative federalism.

The journey began with the First Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) in 1966. The ARC emphasized that the person appointed as Governor should have long experience in public life and, most importantly, a non-partisan attitude. This was intended to ensure the Governor acted as a neutral bridge rather than a political agent Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Centre-State Relations, p.158. Shortly after, the Rajamannar Committee (1969), appointed by the Tamil Nadu government, took a more radical stance. It suggested that the provision allowing the State Ministry to hold office at the "pleasure of the Governor" should be omitted entirely to protect the state's autonomy Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Centre-State Relations, p.159.

However, the most definitive word on this topic comes from the Sarkaria Commission (1983–1988). It laid down strict criteria to ensure the office's dignity:

• The Governor should be an eminent person from outside the state (an "outsider") to avoid local political bias.
• The person should not have participated in active politics for at least some time before the appointment.
• Crucially, the President must consult the Chief Minister of the concerned state before the appointment to ensure smooth relations NCERT Class XI, Political Science, Federalism, p.166.

Regarding tenure, the Sarkaria Commission was firm that the five-year term should not be disturbed except for extremely rare and compelling reasons. This was to prevent the "hire and fire" culture that sometimes surrounds the office when the ruling party at the Centre changes.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Centre-State Relations, p.158-159; NCERT Class XI, Political Science, Federalism, p.166

6. The Sarkaria Commission Recommendations (1983) (exam-level)

To understand the office of the Governor, one must study the Sarkaria Commission (1983–1988). This Commission was established to review Centre-State relations and address the growing friction caused by the perceived 'partisan' role of Governors. While the Constitution provides very minimal qualifications (being a citizen and 35 years of age), the Commission argued that the spirit of the office requires much higher standards to maintain federal harmony Indian Polity, Governor, p.314.

The Commission laid down specific criteria for who should be appointed. They recommended that a Governor should be:

• An eminent person in some walk of life.
• A person from outside the state (not a native) to ensure they aren't embroiled in local party politics.
• A detached figure, not too intimately connected with the local politics of the state.
• Someone who has not participated in active politics in the recent past Indian Polity, Governor, p.314.

The goal was to prevent the office from becoming a 'retirement home' for active politicians or a tool for the Union to destabilize State governments.

Crucially, the Commission proposed a procedural safeguard: the Chief Minister of the State must be consulted before the President appoints a Governor Indian Polity, Governor, p.314. This ensures a functional working relationship from day one. Regarding the security of tenure, the Commission was firm that the five-year term should not be disturbed except for extremely rare and compelling reasons. It discouraged the practice of removing Governors simply because a new party took power at the Centre. Lastly, in the event of a hung assembly, the Commission suggested the Governor should prioritize the leader of a party or group that commands a clear majority to ensure stability Indian Polity, Governor, p.322.

Sources: Indian Polity, Governor, p.314; Indian Polity, Governor, p.322

7. Solving the Original PYQ (exam-level)

Now that you have mastered the constitutional provisions regarding the Governor and the historical tension in Centre-State relations, this question tests your ability to apply those building blocks to the Sarkaria Commission's specific reforms. The core objective of the commission was to transform the Governor from a suspected "political agent" of the Union into a neutral "bridge" between levels of government. To achieve this, the commission focused on three pillars: detachment from local politics, security of tenure, and consultative appointment. When you see these options, you should immediately look for which one disrupts this logic of federal harmony.

The correct answer is (B) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may be consulted by the President in selecting a Governor. In your reasoning, remember that UPSC frequently swaps constitutional authorities to create plausible-sounding traps. The Sarkaria Commission actually recommended that the Chief Minister of the concerned state must be consulted before the appointment. This ensures that the appointee is acceptable to the state government, fostering a functional relationship. Consulting the Chief Justice would be logically inconsistent with the commission's goal of improving executive federalism; the judiciary has no constitutional role in selecting state executive heads.

The other options represent the "ideal Governor" profile you studied: (D) ensures the Governor has no local vested interests (the "outsider" rule), (A) ensures they aren't using the office for immediate partisan gain, and (C) addresses the "doctrine of pleasure" trap where Governors are often dismissed when the Union government changes. By ensuring the five-year term is rarely disturbed, the commission sought to provide the stability you learned is essential for the neutrality of the office. These recommendations, found in the Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations, remain the benchmark for evaluating the Governor's role today.