Consider the following state- ments : 1. The anti-defection law bans an elected member from voting against the explicit mandate of his/her party. 2. The anti-defection provi- sions do not apply if one- third of the members of a party disobey the mandate of the party and constitute themselves as a separate party. Which of the statements given above is/ are correct ?

1. Origins and Objective of the Tenth Schedule (basic)

To understand the **Anti-Defection Law**, we must first look at the chaotic political landscape of the 1960s and 70s. During this period, India witnessed frequent 'floor-crossing'—a practice where legislators would switch parties after being elected, often in exchange for ministerial berths or other incentives. This reached a peak in 1967 when a Haryana MLA named Gaya Lal changed his party thrice in a single fortnight! This gave birth to the famous political slogan "Aya Ram, Gaya Ram" (Ram has come, Ram has gone), symbolizing the instability that plagued Indian democracy Politics in India since Independence, NCERT (2025 ed.), Challenges to and Restoration of the Congress System, p.81. To curb this opportunistic 'musical chairs' of politics, the Parliament enacted the **52nd Constitutional Amendment Act in 1985**. This landmark amendment introduced the **Tenth Schedule** to the Constitution, providing a legal framework for the disqualification of members on the grounds of defection Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Anti-Defection Law, p.597. The primary objective was to ensure **political stability** by penalizing those who betrayed the mandate of the voters by leaving the party on whose ticket they were elected. As the law evolved, it became stricter. Initially, the Tenth Schedule allowed for a 'split' if one-third of the party members defected together. However, this 'wholesale defection' was still causing instability. Consequently, the **91st Constitutional Amendment Act of 2003** deleted this provision. Today, the law only recognizes a legitimate 'merger' if at least **two-thirds** of the members of a legislature party agree to it Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Anti-Defection Law, p.598.

Sources: Politics in India since Independence, NCERT (2025 ed.), Challenges to and Restoration of the Congress System, p.81; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Anti-Defection Law, p.597-598

2. Grounds for Disqualification under Tenth Schedule (basic)

To understand the Tenth Schedule, we must look at how it categorizes legislators. The law doesn't treat everyone the same; it creates specific rules for members of political parties, independent candidates, and nominated members. The overarching goal is to ensure that the mandate given by the voters is respected and that 'horse-trading' is discouraged. For members belonging to a political party, there are two primary 'tripwires': voluntarily giving up membership (which the courts have interpreted broadly to include conduct, not just formal resignation) and violating the party whip. If a member votes or abstains contrary to the party's direction without prior permission, they face disqualification, provided the party does not 'forgive' or condone the act within 15 days Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 85, p. 597. For those who enter the House without a party affiliation, the rules are even stricter to prevent them from becoming 'political mercenaries.' The following table breaks down how these different categories of members incur disqualification:

Member Category	Grounds for Disqualification
Members of Political Parties	Voluntarily resigning OR voting against the party 'Whip' (unless condoned within 15 days).
Independent Members	Disqualified if they join any political party after their election.
Nominated Members	Disqualified if they join a political party after six months of taking their seat.

It is important to note that the law has evolved to become more stringent over time. Originally, the Tenth Schedule allowed for a 'split' if one-third of a party's members left together. However, this was often abused for bulk defections. Consequently, the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act (2003) deleted this provision. Today, the only major protection from disqualification is a merger, which requires at least two-thirds of the members of a legislature party to agree to the move Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 85, p. 598.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 85: Anti-Defection Law, p.597-598; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 22: Parliament, p.227

3. Role and Powers of the Presiding Officer (intermediate)

In our journey through the Anti-Defection Law, we now reach a critical pivot point: Who actually decides if a member has defected? Under the Tenth Schedule, the authority is not the President or the Governor, but the Presiding Officer of the House — the Speaker in the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies, and the Chairman in the Rajya Sabha and Legislative Councils Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), State Legislature, p.338. This is a unique departure from other types of disqualifications (like holding an office of profit), where the President or Governor decides based on the Election Commission's advice. In cases of defection, the Presiding Officer has the first and final word within the House. Initially, the 52nd Amendment sought to make the Presiding Officer's decision final and beyond the reach of any court. However, the Supreme Court stepped in with the landmark Kihoto Hollohan case (1992). The Court ruled that while the Presiding Officer is the deciding authority, they function as a quasi-judicial tribunal when adjudicating defection cases Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Landmark Judgements and Their Impact, p.631. Because they act as a tribunal, their decisions are subject to judicial review by the High Courts and the Supreme Court on grounds of mala fides, perversity, or violation of constitutional mandate. To help you distinguish between the different types of disqualification powers, look at this comparison:

Feature	General Disqualifications (Art. 102/191)	Defection Disqualifications (10th Schedule)
Deciding Authority	President (Union) / Governor (State)	Speaker / Chairman of the House
Mandatory Consultation	Must obtain opinion of Election Commission	No requirement to consult the Election Commission
Judicial Status	Executive Decision	Quasi-judicial Tribunal

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), State Legislature, p.338; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Landmark Judgements and Their Impact, p.631; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Parliament, p.227

4. Related Concept: Disqualification under RPA 1951 (intermediate)

In our journey through the disqualification of legislators, we've seen how the Constitution sets the baseline. However, the Constitution also empowers Parliament to add further grounds for disqualification through legislation. This is where the Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1951 comes into play. While the Tenth Schedule focuses on party loyalty, the RPA 1951 focuses on the integrity and conduct of the individual candidate or member M. Laxmikanth, State Legislature, p.338.

The RPA 1951 lists several statutory grounds for disqualification. One of the most critical is criminal conviction: if a person is convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for two years or more, they are disqualified. A landmark shift occurred with the Lily Thomas Case (2013), where the Supreme Court struck down Section 8(4) of the RPA. Previously, convicted members had a three-month window to appeal; now, disqualification is immediate upon conviction M. Laxmikanth, Landmark Judgements and Their Impact, p.638. Other grounds include failing to lodge election expenses, having an interest in government contracts, or being dismissed from government service for corruption or disloyalty to the State.

It is vital to distinguish who makes the final call. For disqualifications arising under the RPA 1951, the decision is made by the President (for MPs) or the Governor (for MLAs). However, they do not act alone—they must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission of India and act according to that opinion M. Laxmikanth, State Legislature, p.338. This is different from the Tenth Schedule, where the Presiding Officer (Speaker/Chairman) holds the power.

Feature	Anti-Defection (10th Schedule)	RPA 1951 Disqualification
Primary Focus	Party discipline and loyalty.	Criminal record, ethics, and election integrity.
Deciding Authority	Presiding Officer (Speaker/Chairman).	President/Governor (based on EC opinion).
Key Trigger	Defection, voting against whip.	Conviction (2+ years), corrupt practices, etc.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, State Legislature, p.338; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Landmark Judgements and Their Impact, p.638

5. Related Concept: Office of Profit and EC Role (intermediate)

To understand the stability of our legislatures, we must look at how members are held accountable beyond just party discipline. While the Anti-Defection Law deals with party loyalty, the concept of 'Office of Profit' ensures that legislators remain independent of the executive branch. Under Articles 102(1)(a) and 191(1)(a) of the Constitution, a person is disqualified from being a member of Parliament or a State Legislature if they hold any office of profit under the Union or State government (unless exempted by law). The underlying philosophy is simple: a legislator should not be in a position where their duties to the public conflict with their personal interests or benefits received from the government. Critically, the Constitution does not define what constitutes an 'Office of Profit.' Instead, this has been shaped by judicial interpretations and the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959, which lists specific posts that do not disqualify a member. As noted in Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), World Constitutions (Practice), p.757, this Act has been amended several times to protect various positions from being classified as offices of profit. When a question arises regarding whether a member has incurred such a disqualification, the decision-making process differs significantly from defection cases. While the Speaker decides on defection, for Office of Profit, the President (for MPs) or the Governor (for MLAs) is the deciding authority. However, they do not act alone; they must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission (EC) and act according to that opinion. This makes the EC’s role pivotal and its advice binding on the President or Governor. This creates a robust check and balance, ensuring that disqualifications are handled by an independent constitutional body rather than being left solely to political presiding officers.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), World Constitutions (Practice Questions), p.757

6. Evolution of Exceptions: The 91st Amendment Act (exam-level)

Hello! We’ve reached a critical turning point in the story of the Anti-Defection Law. When the Tenth Schedule was first introduced in 1985, it had a bit of a "safety valve" that unintendedly became a loophole. This was the 'Split' provision. Under the original rules, if one-third (1/3rd) of a legislature party broke away to form a new group, they were exempt from disqualification. The logic was to protect genuine ideological rifts, but in practice, it encouraged mass defections. Political engineers realized that while it was hard to defect alone, it was quite easy to convince a third of the party to jump ship together. Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Anti-Defection Law, p.598

To plug this gap, Parliament passed the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act of 2003. This was a landmark reform that fundamentally tightened the law. Its most significant impact on the Tenth Schedule was the total deletion of the provision regarding 'splits'. Today, the law no longer recognizes a split as a valid defense. Whether you defect alone or with 30% of your colleagues, you face disqualification. The only remaining major exception is a 'Merger', which requires at least two-thirds (2/3rd) of the members of a legislature party to agree to join another party. Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Anti-Defection Law, p.599

Beyond just the Tenth Schedule, the 91st Amendment also addressed the incentive for defection. Often, members defected because they were promised a cabinet berth. To curb this, the Amendment inserted Article 72(1A) and 164(1A), which mandate that the total number of ministers (including the PM/CM) in the Council of Ministers shall not exceed 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha or the State Legislative Assembly respectively. Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Central Council of Ministers, p.213

Evolution of Exceptions at a Glance:

Feature	Before 91st Amendment (1985–2003)	After 91st Amendment (2003–Present)
Split Exemption	Allowed if 1/3rd of members defected.	Completely Abolished.
Merger Exemption	Allowed if 2/3rd of members agreed.	Maintained at 2/3rd requirement.
Ministerial Limit	No constitutional cap on size.	Capped at 15% of House strength.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Anti-Defection Law, p.598-599; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Central Council of Ministers, p.213

7. Solving the Original PYQ (exam-level)

You’ve just mastered the Tenth Schedule, and this question tests your ability to apply those core pillars: party discipline and the legal evolution of exemptions. Statement 1 examines a fundamental ground for disqualification—the violation of a party whip. As you learned, the law ensures legislative stability by requiring members to follow the explicit mandate of their party during voting. This is the very essence of preventing 'floor-crossing' that the law was designed to curb, making Statement 1 a straightforward application of the primary rule found in the Constitution of India.

Now, let’s look at Statement 2, which is where the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 becomes your critical filter. While the original 1985 law allowed for a 'split' by one-third of the members, that provision was identified as a loophole and subsequently deleted. According to Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, the law currently only recognizes a merger involving at least two-thirds of the members of a legislature party. Therefore, the 'one-third' rule mentioned in the statement is an outdated legal artifact, rendering Statement 2 incorrect.

In the UPSC arena, a common trap is testing you on repealed provisions or shifting numbers to see if you have moved beyond basic rote memorization. Options (B) and (C) are traps designed for students who haven't updated their knowledge regarding the 2003 amendment. By keeping the 'one-third' figure in the option, the examiner is checking your awareness of the current two-thirds merger threshold. Since Statement 1 is factually sound and Statement 2 is legally obsolete, the correct answer is (A) 1 only.

Sources: ;