The Veerapa Moily Commission in its report on Administrative Reforms among other aspects has suggested doing away with which one of the following pairs of Articles of the Constitution of India ?

1. Public Services in the Indian Constitution (Part XIV) (basic)

In a parliamentary democracy like India, while the political executive (ministers) changes with every election, the permanent executive—composed of civil servants—ensures continuity in administration. To safeguard these officials from political whims and ensure they remain non-partisan and professional, the makers of our Constitution dedicated Part XIV (Articles 308 to 323) to the Public Services Indian Constitution at Work, EXECUTIVE, p.95. This part is divided into two chapters: Chapter I deals with the Services (Articles 308-314) and Chapter II deals with the Public Service Commissions (Articles 315-323) Indian Polity, Salient Features of the Constitution, p.37.

At the heart of the relationship between the State and its employees are two critical concepts: the 'Doctrine of Pleasure' and Constitutional Safeguards. Under Article 310, every person who is a member of a civil service holds office during the 'pleasure' of the President (for Union services) or the Governor (for State services). However, this pleasure is not absolute; it is limited by Article 311, which acts as a protective shield for civil servants. These protections ensure that an officer cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one who appointed them, and they must be given a 'reasonable opportunity of being heard' before such a penalty is imposed Introduction to the Constitution of India, THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p.437.

Provision	Article	Core Meaning
Doctrine of Pleasure	310	The tenure of a civil servant is subject to the will of the executive head (President/Governor).
Procedural Safeguards	311	Mandates a formal inquiry and a right to defense before dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank.

While these safeguards are essential for an impartial bureaucracy, they have faced criticism for sometimes protecting inefficient or corrupt officials. This led the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), chaired by M. Veerappa Moily, to suggest that the constitutional entrenchment of Articles 310 and 311 should be reconsidered. The Commission argued for moving toward a more performance-oriented framework governed by legislation under Article 309, rather than rigid constitutional protection, to better balance security of tenure with professional accountability Indian Polity, Public Services, p.548.

Sources: Indian Constitution at Work, Political Science Class XI (NCERT 2025 ed.), EXECUTIVE, p.95; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.), Salient Features of the Constitution, p.37; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.), Public Services, p.548; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p.437

2. Article 309: Recruitment and Conditions of Service (intermediate)

In any constitutional democracy, the relationship between the state and its employees must be governed by law rather than whim. Article 309 of the Indian Constitution serves as the primary 'enabling provision' that allows the government to set rules for its personnel. It specifies that the appropriate Legislature (Parliament for the Union and State Legislatures for the States) has the power to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74, p. 548. This includes aspects like the method of entry, pay, allowances, leave, and retirement age.

One of the most critical aspects of Article 309 is its proviso (an exception or condition). While the primary power lies with the Legislature, the President (for Union services) or the Governor (for State services) is empowered to make rules regulating recruitment and service conditions until the respective Legislature passes an actual Act. These executive rules remain valid and have the force of law as long as a formal legislative Act is not in place Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu, THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p. 445. In practice, most service conditions in India are still governed by these executive rules (like the Central Civil Services Rules) rather than comprehensive Acts of Parliament.

However, the power granted under Article 309 is not absolute. Any law or rule made under this Article is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution." This means that service rules cannot violate Fundamental Rights—for instance, they cannot be discriminatory under Article 14 or 16. Furthermore, these rules must respect the protections granted to civil servants under Articles 310 and 311. Interestingly, the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) suggested that the constitutional protections in Articles 310 and 311 should be removed and instead be governed by ordinary legislation under Article 309 to ensure greater accountability and performance Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74, p. 548.

Feature	Legislative Power	Executive Power (Proviso)
Authority	Parliament / State Legislature	President / Governor
Nature	Primary (Act of Legislature)	Interim/Gap-filling (Rules)
Hierarchy	Overrides executive rules	Valid only until a law is made

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74: Public Services, p.548; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu, THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p.445

3. Article 310: The Doctrine of Pleasure (intermediate)

In the realm of public services, the Doctrine of Pleasure is a fundamental concept inherited from the British common law system. In England, the rule is that a public servant holds office at the 'pleasure of the Crown,' meaning the Crown can terminate their services at any time without assigning a reason. In the Indian context, this is embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution, which specifies that every person who is a member of a Civil Service or holds a post under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the President, and those under a State hold office during the pleasure of the Governor Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu, THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p.435. While this may sound like the executive has arbitrary power, the Indian version is not absolute. Unlike the British system where the Crown's pleasure is unfettered, the Indian Constitution balances this 'pleasure' with specific safeguards. For instance, the power to compulsory retire a government servant is considered a facet of this doctrine, but any dismissal must generally respect the procedural safeguards provided elsewhere in the Constitution Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu, THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p.435. Furthermore, certain high-ranking officials are excluded from the scope of Article 310 to ensure their independence; they cannot be removed at 'pleasure' and must follow rigorous removal processes.

To better understand the nuances, let's look at how the Indian application differs from its British roots:

Feature	British Doctrine	Indian Doctrine (Art. 310)
Nature of Power	Absolute and unfettered.	Subject to Constitutional limitations (like Art. 311).
High Officials	Generally covered by Crown's pleasure.	Specific exceptions (Judges, CAG, CEC) are immune.
Redressal	No cause of action for wrongful dismissal.	Actionable if Constitutional safeguards are violated.

Recently, there has been significant debate regarding the relevance of this doctrine. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), chaired by M. Veerappa Moily, recommended the deletion of Article 310. The Commission argued that this constitutional entrenchment makes it difficult to maintain discipline and accountability. They suggested that instead of a 'pleasure' model, the protection of civil servants should be governed by regular legislation under Article 309, which would allow for a more performance-oriented and flexible administration Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Public Services, p.548.

Sources: Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p.435; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.), THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p.436; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth (7th ed.), Public Services, p.548

4. Article 311: Constitutional Safeguards for Civil Servants (exam-level)

In a parliamentary democracy like India, the civil service provides the continuity and expertise required for governance. However, to ensure they can function without fear of political whims, the Constitution provides them with a safety net. This starts with the 'Doctrine of Pleasure' under Article 310, which states that civil servants hold office during the pleasure of the President (for Union services) or the Governor (for State services) Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74: Public Services, p. 548. While this sounds absolute, it is actually qualified by the safeguards in Article 311.

Article 311 acts as a constitutional shield against arbitrary executive action. It provides two fundamental procedural safeguards to members of the All-India Services, Central Civil Services, State Civil Services, and those holding 'civil posts':

• Protection against Subordinate Authority: A civil servant cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed them Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74: Public Services, p. 548. This prevents lower-level officials from victimizing their staff.
• Right to a Fair Inquiry: No civil servant can be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank except after an inquiry where they are informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. This is a manifestation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem (hear the other side).

However, this protection is not an absolute immunity. There are three critical exceptions under Article 311(2) where an inquiry can be dispensed with:

Exception Condition	Description
Criminal Conviction	If a person is dismissed or reduced in rank based on conduct that led to a conviction on a criminal charge Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu, THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p. 438.
Impracticability	Where the authority empowered to dismiss/remove is satisfied (for reasons recorded in writing) that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry.
Security of State	Where the President or Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such an inquiry.

Despite these safeguards, there is a growing debate on performance and accountability. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), led by M. Veerappa Moily, recommended the deletion of Articles 310 and 311. The Commission argued that these constitutional protections have become an impediment to effective discipline, suggesting that civil servant protection should instead be governed by ordinary legislation under Article 309 to allow for a more performance-oriented bureaucracy Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74: Public Services, p. 548.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74: Public Services, p.548; Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu, THE SERVICES AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS, p.437-438

5. Evolution of Administrative Reforms Commissions (ARC) (basic)

In the journey of Indian governance, the Administrative Reforms Commissions (ARC) serve as the most significant milestones for evaluating and overhauling the machinery of the state. Think of these commissions as 'health check-ups' for the bureaucracy. The First ARC was established in 1966, initially under the chairmanship of Morarji Desai (and later K. Hanumanthayya), with a massive mandate to examine the entire public administration system, including the delicate balance of Centre-State relations Laxmikanth, Centre-State Relations, p.158. This commission was pivotal in recommending the establishment of an Inter-State Council under Article 263 and led to the creation of the Department of Personnel in 1970, placed directly under the Prime Minister's charge Laxmikanth, World Constitutions, p.760.

Nearly four decades later, the Second ARC (2005), chaired by M. Veerappa Moily, was constituted to address the challenges of a 21st-century globalized India. While the First ARC focused on building the foundational structures of the new republic, the Second ARC shifted its gaze toward efficiency, accountability, and ethics. A major area of its work involved 'Refurbishing Personnel Administration.' It notably critiqued the Groups of Ministers (GoMs), observing that an excessive number of these groups led to delays, and recommended a more selective and empowered approach to ensure effective coordination Laxmikanth, Cabinet Committees, p.221.

Perhaps the most radical suggestion of the Second ARC was the deletion of Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution. Article 310 contains the 'doctrine of pleasure' (civil servants hold office during the President's/Governor's pleasure), while Article 311 provides procedural safeguards against arbitrary dismissal. The Commission argued that these constitutional protections, while originally intended to provide security, had become impediments to discipline. They suggested that civil service protections should instead be governed by specific legislation under Article 309, allowing for a more flexible, performance-oriented framework where corrupt or non-performing officials could be held accountable more swiftly.

Feature	First ARC (1966)	Second ARC (2005)
Chairman	Morarji Desai / K. Hanumanthayya	M. Veerappa Moily
Key Focus	Structural reorganization & Centre-State relations	Ethics, accountability, & performance-based administration
Major Legacy	Inter-State Council & Dept. of Personnel	Citizen-centric governance & proposed removal of Art. 311

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Centre-State Relations, p.158; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, World Constitutions, p.760; Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Cabinet Committees, p.221

6. Civil Service Accountability and Performance Reforms (intermediate)

In any robust democracy, the civil service must balance two competing values: independence (to act without political fear) and accountability (to ensure performance and integrity). In India, this balance is struck through specific constitutional provisions. Article 310 enshrines the 'Doctrine of Pleasure,' stating that civil servants hold office during the pleasure of the President or Governor. However, this is not absolute; it is limited by Article 311, which provides vital procedural safeguards. These safeguards ensure that no civil servant is dismissed or reduced in rank without an inquiry and a reasonable opportunity to be heard Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.), Chapter 74: Public Services, p. 548.

While these protections were originally designed to foster a non-partisan and professional bureaucracy Indian Constitution at Work, Political Science Class XI (NCERT 2025 ed.), EXECUTIVE, p. 95, critics argue they have become a shield for the inefficient. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), in its 10th Report, 'Refurbishing of Personnel Administration,' took a radical stance. It argued that Article 311 has become an impediment to effective discipline. The Commission recommended deleting Articles 310 and 311 from the Constitution, suggesting that the rights and protections of civil servants should instead be governed by ordinary legislation under Article 309.

The goal of this reform is to transition from a tenure-based security model to a performance-based accountability model. By moving these protections from the Constitution to legislative statutes, the government would have more flexibility to deal with corrupt or non-performing officials without the prolonged legal battles that constitutional entrenchment often invites. This shift aims to create a more result-oriented bureaucracy that remains professional but is more responsive to modern governance needs.

Provision	Current Status (Constitutional)	Proposed Reform (Legislative)
Source of Protection	Articles 310 & 311 (Hard to amend)	Article 309 (Acts of Parliament/State Legislature)
Primary Focus	Security of Tenure & Due Process	Performance Accountability & Agility
Disciplinary Action	Often delayed by rigid legal safeguards	Streamlined through statutory rules

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.), Chapter 74: Public Services, p.548; Indian Constitution at Work, Political Science Class XI (NCERT 2025 ed.), EXECUTIVE, p.95

7. Reports of the Second ARC (Veerappa Moily Commission) (exam-level)

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), constituted in 2005 under the chairmanship of M. Veerappa Moily, was tasked with preparing a blueprint for revamping the public administration system in India. While the first ARC (1966) focused heavily on restructuring the machinery of government and Centre-State relations Indian Polity, Centre State Relations, p.158, the Second ARC took a deep dive into Ethics in Governance and Personnel Administration Indian Polity, Electoral Reforms, p.582. One of its most radical and debated recommendations appeared in its 10th Report, 'Refurbishing of Personnel Administration,' where it called for the deletion of Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution.

Under the current framework, Article 310 establishes the 'Doctrine of Pleasure,' stating that civil servants hold office at the pleasure of the President or Governor. Article 311 acts as a protective shield, providing procedural safeguards: it ensures that no civil servant is dismissed by an authority subordinate to the one who appointed them and mandates a 'reasonable opportunity' to be heard before removal Indian Polity, Public Services, p.548. The Moily Commission argued that these constitutional protections have ironically become a haven for the inefficient and the corrupt. The complex legal hurdles required to take action against a delinquent officer often lead to endless litigation, making it extremely difficult for the state to maintain discipline.

To bridge the gap between security of tenure and administrative efficiency, the Commission suggested that instead of constitutional entrenchment, the rights and safeguards of civil servants should be governed by ordinary legislation under Article 309. Article 309 already empowers the Parliament and State Legislatures to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service. By moving these safeguards into a statute (law) rather than the Constitution, the government would have more flexibility to create a result-oriented bureaucracy. This shift aims to transform the civil service culture from one of 'entitlement' to one of 'performance,' ensuring that while honest officers are protected, the non-performers can be dealt with more swiftly.

Sources: Indian Polity, Electoral Reforms, p.582; Indian Polity, Centre State Relations, p.158; Indian Polity, Public Services, p.548

8. 2nd ARC's 10th Report: Refurbishing of Personnel Administration (exam-level)

To understand the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission's (ARC) 10th Report, titled 'Refurbishing of Personnel Administration,' we must first grasp the tension between stability and accountability in the civil services. Historically, the Indian Constitution provided a robust safety net for civil servants. Under Article 310, the 'Doctrine of Pleasure' states that civil servants hold office during the pleasure of the President or Governor. However, this is restricted by Article 311, which provides procedural safeguards, ensuring that no civil servant is dismissed or reduced in rank without a fair inquiry and a reasonable opportunity to be heard Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74, p.548.

The 2nd ARC, chaired by M. Veerappa Moily, argued that while these protections were intended to protect honest officers from political interference, they have evolved into a shield for the inefficient and the corrupt. The commission observed that the constitutional nature of these protections makes the process of removing 'deadwood' from the administration excessively slow and legally complex. Consequently, the 10th Report made a landmark recommendation: the deletion of Articles 310 and 311 from the Constitution. The Commission believed that civil service protections should not be constitutionally entrenched but should instead be governed by parliamentary legislation enacted under Article 309.

The philosophical shift here is from a security-of-tenure model to a performance-oriented model. By moving these protections to ordinary law (Article 309), the government would have the flexibility to refine disciplinary procedures without needing a constitutional amendment. This would allow for a more agile bureaucracy where accountability is paramount and non-performance has real consequences. The ARC's vision was to create a civil service that is professional and result-oriented, ensuring that 'due process' does not become an 'insuperable obstacle' to effective administration.

Sources: Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth, Chapter 74: Public Services, p.548

9. Solving the Original PYQ (exam-level)

Now that you have mastered the Constitutional Provisions related to Public Services, you can see how the building blocks of Article 310 (Doctrine of Pleasure) and Article 311 (Safeguards to Civil Servants) form the core of this question. The Veerappa Moily Commission, better known as the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2nd ARC), analyzed whether these safeguards—originally intended to protect honest officers—had turned into a shield for the inefficient. By connecting your knowledge of administrative accountability with the Commission's focus on "Refurbishing Personnel Administration," you can deduce that the goal was to shift the protection of civil servants from a rigid "Constitutional Right" to a more flexible statutory framework governed by legislation under Article 309.

To arrive at the correct answer, (D) Articles 310 and 311, you must think like a reformer: if the objective is to simplify the removal of corrupt or non-performing officials, the primary target would be the articles that provide constitutional immunity against summary dismissal. Reasoning through this, Article 310 establishes that tenure is held at the pleasure of the President/Governor, while Article 311 mandates rigorous procedural safeguards (like the right to be heard) before any major penalty. The Commission argued that these specific provisions had become impediments to effective discipline, as highlighted in Indian Polity by M. Laxmikanth.

UPSC frequently uses sequential number traps to confuse candidates. Options (A) and (B) are distractors involving Articles 305 to 307, which actually pertain to Trade, Commerce, and Intercourse within India—topics entirely unrelated to personnel reforms. Option (C) is a common trap because Article 308 is merely an interpretation clause and Article 309 is the very provision the Commission wanted to utilize more effectively. By recognizing that the "safeguard-doctrine pair" (310 and 311) is the specific bottleneck for administrative flexibility, you can confidently eliminate the surrounding numerical sequences.