Consider the following regarding the defeat of Marathas in the third battle of Panipat. 1. Tactical errors by Sadashiv Rao Bhao 2. Superior generalship of Ahmad Shah Abdali 3. Presence of a large number of non- combatants in the Maratha army 4. Treachery of a commander, Ibrahim Khan Gardi, of the Maratha army Which of these were the causes of the defeat of Marathas?

1. Rise of the Maratha Confederacy and the Peshwas (basic)

To understand the Maratha Confederacy, we must first look at how the power structure shifted from the King (the Chhatrapati) to the Prime Minister (the Peshwa). Originally, under Chhatrapati Shivaji, the Peshwa was merely one of the eight ministers in the Ashta Pradhan council and the office was not hereditary History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.235. However, following the internal civil war between Shahu and Tarabai, the genius of Balaji Vishwanath (1713–1720) changed everything. By helping Shahu consolidate his throne and securing rights like Chauth and Sardeshmukhi from the Mughals, Balaji Vishwanath made the office of the Peshwa supreme and hereditary, effectively making the Chhatrapati a ceremonial figurehead at Satara History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.235.

The real architect of Maratha imperial glory was Balaji’s son, Baji Rao I (1720–1740). He moved away from the policy of staying in the Deccan and advocated for a "Forward Policy" to strike at the roots of the decaying Mughal Empire. Baji Rao I was a military genius who defeated the Nizam of Hyderabad and secured territories in Malwa, Gujarat, and Bundelkhand History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.231. To manage such a vast and rapidly expanding empire, he encouraged powerful Maratha families to carve out their own spheres of influence, leading to the birth of the Maratha Confederacy. This was not a centralized state but a loose union of semi-autonomous chiefs who recognized the Peshwa as their nominal head.

The Confederacy was composed of five primary power centers, each led by a specific family in a specific region:

• The Peshwa at Pune (The coordinating head)
• The Scindias (Shindes) at Gwalior
• The Holkars at Indore
• The Gaekwads at Baroda
• The Bhonsles at Nagpur

By the time of Balaji Baji Rao (Nana Saheb), the Marathas had reached their territorial zenith. However, the very nature of the Confederacy — where individual chiefs often pursued their own interests — became a double-edged sword. While it allowed for rapid expansion across India, it also led to internal rivalries and a lack of unity that the British would eventually exploit A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.), Expansion and Consolidation of British Power in India, p.107.

Sources: History , class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.231, 235; A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.). SPECTRUM., Expansion and Consolidation of British Power in India, p.107

2. Maratha Revenue Systems and Political Friction (basic)

To understand the Maratha Empire, we must first look at its financial engine. Unlike the Mughals, who relied on a settled land revenue system from their core territories, the Marathas developed a unique fiscal model to sustain their rapid expansion and massive military. This system was built on two primary pillars: Chauth and Sardeshmukhi. These were not just taxes; they were political tools collected from territories not directly under Maratha rule, such as Mughal provinces and the Deccan Sultanates History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.230. In return for these payments, the Marathas promised protection and agreed not to interfere in the internal administration of those provinces Exploring Society: India and Beyond, Class VIII, NCERT (Revised ed 2025), The Rise of the Marathas, p.74.

The distribution of these funds highlights the military nature of the Maratha state. The Chauth (which literally means one-fourth) was not kept entirely by the ruler. Instead, it was divided to ensure the machinery of the empire kept running:

Recipient	Share of Chauth	Purpose
The Ruler (Chhatrapati/Peshwa)	25%	Central treasury and royal expenses.
Military Heads & Officials	66%	Maintenance of troops (the largest share).
Pant Sachiv (Chief Minister)	6%	Administrative oversight.
Tax Collectors	3%	Cost of collection.

History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.236

While this system provided the wealth needed to challenge the Mughals, it carried a heavy political cost. By demanding 25% of the revenue (Chauth) plus an additional 10% (Sardeshmukhi) from neighboring regions, the Marathas were often viewed as predatory rather than as liberators. This created deep-seated political friction. By the mid-18th century, their aggressive tax collection and expansionist policies had alienated potential allies like the Rajputs, Jats, and Sikhs. When the Marathas eventually faced external threats from the north, they found themselves diplomatically isolated, having traded long-term alliances for short-term revenue History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.233.

Sources: History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.230, 233, 236; Exploring Society: India and Beyond, Class VIII, NCERT (Revised ed 2025), The Rise of the Marathas, p.74

3. The Afghan Intervention: Ahmad Shah Abdali (intermediate)

To understand the rise of Ahmad Shah Abdali, we must first look at the vacuum left by the Persian invader Nadir Shah. After Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1747, Abdali—one of his most capable military generals—emerged as the independent ruler of Afghanistan, founding the Durrani Empire History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.232. Abdali did not just inherit Nadir Shah's throne; he inherited his ambitions toward India, which was then a "tottering" empire unable to defend its North-West frontier.

Between 1748 and 1767, Abdali invaded India seven times. Unlike the British, his primary goal initially wasn't to establish a permanent administrative colony, but to plunder resources and establish a sphere of influence. By 1757, he had captured Delhi, yet rather than staying to rule, he acted as a kingmaker. He recognized Alamgir II as the Mughal emperor but ensured his own man, the Rohilla chief Najib-ud-Daula, was appointed as Mir Bakhshi (supreme agent) to safeguard Afghan interests Rajiv Ahir, A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.), India on the Eve of British Conquest, p.60. This effectively turned the Mughal Emperor into a puppet of the Afghan crown.

The turning point in his intervention was the clash with the Marathas. As the Marathas expanded northward into Punjab and expelled Abdali's agents, a direct confrontation became inevitable. This culminated in the Third Battle of Panipat (1761). While Abdali won a crushing victory, the long-term result was paradoxical: he did not found a new Afghan kingdom in India, and his successors eventually lost control of the Punjab to the rising power of the Sikh chiefs Modern India, Bipin Chandra, History class XII (NCERT 1982 ed.), The Decline of the Mughal Empire, p.8. However, by breaking the back of Maratha power and exposing the Mughals' terminal weakness, Abdali's interventions inadvertently cleared the political stage for the British East India Company.

Sources: History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.232; Rajiv Ahir, A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.), India on the Eve of British Conquest, p.60; Modern India, Bipin Chandra, History class XII (NCERT 1982 ed.), The Decline of the Mughal Empire, p.8

4. Eighteenth-Century Geopolitics: Diplomacy and Alliances (intermediate)

In the mid-18th century, Indian geopolitics was characterized by Realpolitik—a system where alliances were fluid, driven by immediate survival rather than long-term stability or shared ideology. As the Mughal Empire declined, a power vacuum emerged, leading to a complex 'triangular' struggle between the Marathas, the Afghans (under Ahmad Shah Abdali), and the British East India Company. Understanding why the Marathas, despite being the most formidable indigenous power, found themselves diplomatically isolated by 1761 is crucial to understanding the transition of power in India.

The Marathas reached the zenith of their influence in the 1750s, essentially making the Mughal Wazir, Imad-ul-Mulk, a puppet in their hands History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.232. However, their method of expansion proved to be their diplomatic undoing. By demanding Chauth (tribute) and interfering in the internal successions of Rajput states, they alienated traditional allies. When Raghunath Rao expelled Abdali’s agent, Najib-ud-Daula, from Delhi and captured Punjab in 1758, it directly provoked an Afghan invasion Rajiv Ahir, A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.), India on the Eve of British Conquest, p.60. While Abdali successfully built a 'Muslim Confederacy' by winning over Shuja-ud-Daula (Nawab of Awadh) and the Rohilla chiefs, the Marathas failed to secure support from the Sikhs, the Jats (led by Suraj Mal), or the Rajputs, all of whom distrusted Maratha intentions.

Power Center	Diplomatic Stance (c. 1761)	Reasoning
Nawab of Awadh	Allied with Abdali	Persuaded by Najib-ud-Daula; feared Maratha expansion into his territories.
Jats & Rajputs	Neutral/Withdrawn	Alienated by high tribute demands and Maratha interference in their politics.
The Sikhs	Hostile to both	Distrusted Maratha claims over Punjab and were fighting their own war with Abdali.

Furthermore, the Marathas' lack of strategic foresight regarding the British proved fatal. While the Peshwa was preoccupied with the politics of the Delhi court, the British were consolidating their hold over Bengal. Had the Marathas cooperated with regional powers in the East or South earlier, they might have checked the British advance History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.232. Instead, their isolation at Panipat in 1761 not only shattered their dream of an all-India empire but also cleared the path for British supremacy.

Sources: History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.232-233; Rajiv Ahir, A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.), India on the Eve of British Conquest, p.60

5. The Logistics and Military Organization of 1761 (exam-level)

The Third Battle of Panipat (1761) serves as a masterclass in how logistical failures can neutralize even the most formidable military might. By 1760, the Marathas had reached their zenith after the Battle of Udgir Tamilnadu state board, The Marathas, p.232, yet their military organization was undergoing a risky transition. Traditionally masters of Ganimi Kava (guerrilla warfare), the Marathas under the Peshwas had increasingly modeled their army on the Mughal military system, focusing on heavy infantry, slow-moving artillery, and a massive baggage train Tamilnadu state board, The Marathas, p.236.

The primary logistical burden was the presence of thousands of non-combatants—pilgrims and family members—who accompanied the army. This turned the military expedition into a 'moving city' that required immense food supplies. When Sadashiv Rao Bhau decided to entrench the army at Panipat, he inadvertently allowed Ahmad Shah Abdali to occupy a superior strategic position. Abdali, an exceptional organizer, successfully cut off the Maratha supply lines from Delhi and the south. This created a starvation blockade; for months, the Maratha soldiers and their horses went without adequate food, while the Afghan forces remained well-supplied via local alliances.

From a tactical standpoint, the military organization of the two sides offered a sharp contrast. While the Marathas possessed a sophisticated artillery wing led by the loyal Ibrahim Khan Gardi, they were outmatched by Abdali’s Zamburaks (long-range swivel guns mounted on camels), which provided high mobility and devastating firepower. The Maratha defeat was not due to a lack of bravery—indeed, they fought until they reached a state of 'do-or-die' desperation—but rather the collapse of their supply chain and the inability to manage a conventional set-piece battle while burdened by a massive non-fighting population Bipin Chandra, Indian States and Society in the 18th Century, p.33.

Sources: History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.232, 236; Modern India, Bipin Chandra, History class XII (NCERT 1982 ed.), Indian States and Society in the 18th Century, p.33

6. Leadership and Tactical Errors: Sadashiv Rao Bhau (exam-level)

The Third Battle of Panipat (1761) was a watershed moment that halted the Maratha ambition of replacing the Mughals as the masters of India. While the Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao sent the army under the nominal command of his young son Vishwas Rao, the actual leadership rested with his cousin, Sadashiv Rao Bhau Modern India, Bipin Chandra, Indian States and Society in the 18th Century, p.32. Bhau was a capable administrator but his leadership in this campaign was marred by several critical tactical and strategic errors.

One of the most fatal mistakes was the decision to entrench the army at Panipat. Traditionally, Marathas excelled in Ganimi Kava (guerrilla warfare) and mobile cavalry strikes. By opting for a fixed, defensive position in a town far from their home base, Bhau allowed Ahmad Shah Abdali to utilize his superior military organization to encircle the Maratha camp. This move effectively cut off the Maratha supply lines, leading to a state of near-starvation for the soldiers and horses weeks before the actual battle began.

Furthermore, the Maratha camp was burdened by thousands of non-combatants, including pilgrims and family members. While Panipat's flat ground was generally suitable for cavalry A Brief History of Modern India, SPECTRUM, India on the Eve of British Conquest, p.61, the presence of these civilians turned the camp into a logistical nightmare. In contrast, Abdali’s forces were streamlined and highly mobile. A common misconception involves Ibrahim Khan Gardi, the commander of the Maratha artillery; however, historical records confirm he was a loyal professional who led his European-style infantry valiantly and died in service to the Marathas Modern India, Bipin Chandra, Indian States and Society in the 18th Century, p.32.

Factor	Maratha Position (Bhau)	Afghan Position (Abdali)
Strategy	Entrenched/Defensive; abandoned guerrilla roots.	Aggressive encirclement; cut off enemy supplies.
Logistics	Strained by thousands of non-combatants/pilgrims.	Highly mobile, professional combat force.
Diplomacy	Isolated; failed to secure local Jat or Rajput allies.	Successfully rallied Rohillas and the Nawab of Awadh.

Sources: Modern India (Old NCERT), Indian States and Society in the 18th Century, p.32; A Brief History of Modern India (Spectrum), India on the Eve of British Conquest, p.61

7. The Gardi Infantry: Ibrahim Khan Gardi (exam-level)

In the complex military landscape of 18th-century India, Ibrahim Khan Gardi stands out as a symbol of military professionalization and cross-cultural loyalty. Originally a general in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad, he was trained by the French general Marquis de Bussy. His troops were known as 'Gardis'—a term derived from the French word 'garde'—and they were highly sought after because they were trained in European-style flintlock infantry tactics and mobile artillery, which were superior to the traditional cavalry-heavy models of Indian powers at the time.

After being dismissed by the Nizam, Ibrahim Khan joined the Marathas under Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao. His arrival marked a significant tactical shift for the Maratha Empire. Traditionally, the Marathas relied on Guerrilla warfare (Ganimi Kava), characterized by high mobility and light cavalry. However, under the influence of leaders like Sadashiv Rao Bhau, they began to adopt a 'set-piece' battle strategy, relying heavily on the heavy artillery and disciplined infantry commanded by Ibrahim Khan Gardi. This shift was a double-edged sword: while it gave the Marathas modern firepower, it also reduced the mobility that had been their greatest strength.

During the Third Battle of Panipat (1761), Ibrahim Khan Gardi commanded the left wing of the Maratha army. Despite the eventual Maratha defeat, his artillery division performed exceptionally well, nearly breaking the right wing of Ahmad Shah Abdali’s Afghan forces. Historical records emphasize his unwavering loyalty; despite being a fellow Muslim, he refused Abdali's invitations to defect, choosing to fight and eventually die in the service of the Marathas. As noted in the context of decisive Indian battles, the defeat at Panipat dealt a severe blow to Maratha ambitions, yet Ibrahim Khan’s role remains a testament to the professionalization of Indian military units during this era History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.232.

Sources: History, class XI (Tamilnadu state board 2024 ed.), The Marathas, p.232

8. Solving the Original PYQ (exam-level)

Now that you have mastered the foundational concepts of Maratha expansionism and the Afghan-Maratha rivalry, this question challenges you to synthesize those building blocks into a cohesive understanding of military failure. To arrive at the correct answer, you must look beyond simple numbers and evaluate the strategic environment. The Marathas, traditionally masters of ganimi kava (guerrilla warfare), abandoned their mobility for a static, entrenched position at Panipat. This tactical error by Sadashiv Rao Bhau (Statement 1) allowed Ahmad Shah Abdali to showcase his superior generalship (Statement 2) by cutting off their supply lines, effectively starving the Maratha camp before the final clash.

Logistics often win or lose wars, and this is where Statement 3 becomes vital. The logistical burden of thousands of non-combatants—family members and pilgrims—drained the Marathas' dwindling food supplies, turning their camp into a liability rather than a fortress. In contrast, Abdali’s forces were highly mobile and well-supplied. When evaluating these factors, you can see how resource management and tactical rigidity directly led to the defeat. This makes Statements 1, 2, and 3 logically sound historical causes as detailed in A New Look at Modern Indian History by B.L. Grover.

The trap in this question lies in Statement 4, a classic UPSC technique of inserting a factually incorrect detail about a key historical figure to test your depth of knowledge. While there was internal friction among Maratha allies, Ibrahim Khan Gardi—the commander of the Gardi artillery—remained steadfastly loyal and was executed by Abdali after the battle. By identifying this historical falsehood, you can eliminate options B, C, and D entirely. This leaves you with the correct answer (A) 1, 2 and 3. Always remember: in high-stakes history questions, UPSC often uses character assassination of loyalist figures as a distractor to see if you can distinguish between political friction and actual treachery.